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Constitutional Law-OBSCENITY REDEFINED-Miller v. California, 93 S.
Ct. 2607 (1973).
When Sir Charles Sidlye exhibited himself nude on a balcony in 1663,'
he undoubtedly did not know his eccentric conduct would foreshadow what
has become one of the most troublesome areas of constitutional law.2 The
failure of the Supreme Court to provide clear constitutional guidelines for
anti-obscenity legislation3 has occasioned confusion among state and fed-
eral authorities,4 has precipitated a flood of litigation burdening the Court
with the task of reviewing a mass of sexually explicit materials to deter-
mine what is and is not obscene,' and has engendered widespread criticism
of the Court's policy in this area of law.
In the recent decision of Miller v. California, the Supreme Court of the
1. Sir Charles Sidlyes Case, 1 Keble 620, 83 Eng. Rep. 1146 (K.B. 1663), was the first
reported common law case on obscenity. For a concise survey of the historical development
of obscenity law from its common law roots see Smith, Obscenity: From Hicklin to Hicklin?
2 U. RiCH. L. NoTEs 289 (1967).
2. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2642 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Interstate Circuit Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704-705 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
3. The Supreme Court has tried to provide a workable definition for obscenity but, to the
chagrin of frustrated legislators, has repeatedly failed. See notes 15, 23 infra. In recent years,
however, the Court appears to have been avoiding the issue:
[W]e have managed the burden of deciding scores of obscenity cases by relying on
per curiam reversals or denials of certiorari-a practice which conceals the rationale
of decision and gives at least the appearance of arbitrary action by this Court. Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2652 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
4. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2652 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Scuncio
v. Columbus Theatre Inc., 108 R.I. 613, 277 A.2d 924 (1971).
The importance of the issue of obscenity is realized by the fact that Congress has passed
at least 20 obscenity statutes since 1942 and that all the states have comparable laws. These
laws are supported by agreements with over 50 nations. Annot., 5 A.L.R. 3d 1158, 1161 (1966).
The Virginia General Assembly passed its first obscenity statute in 1848. Ch. 8,-§ 7 [1847-
1848] Acts of the General Assembly of Va. 110. The law remained basically the same until
its constitutionality was successfully challenged in Goldstein v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 25,
104 S.E.2d 66 (1958). As a result, the Assembly passed a new and more comprehensive
statute. VA. CODE ANN. § § 18.1-22.7-36.3 (1960). The new law was initially praised as the best
that could be hoped for under the then illusive judicial guidelines. See Harrington, The
Evolution of Obscenity Control Statutes, 3 WM. & MARY L. REv. 302, 308-10 (1962); Smith,
supra note 1 at 304; Comment, The Law of Obscenity in Virginia, 17 WASH & LEE L. REv.
322 (1960).
5. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2652 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 434 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
6. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973). The Miller ruling is the key decision among
five companion cases which dealt with the question of obscenity. Kaplan v. California, 93 S.
Ct. 2680 (1973) (material in book form with no pictorial content found obscene); United
States v. Orito, 93 S. Ct. 2674 (1973) (obscenity cannot enter stream of commerce even for
receiver's private use); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 93 S. Ct. 2665
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United States has renewed its effort to fill this constitutional vacuum by
redefining obscenity to provide what the Court believes to be "concrete
guidelines to isolate 'hardcore pornography' from expression protected by
the First Amendment." 7
Marvin Miller was convicted of mailing sexually explicit materials to
unwilling recipients in violation of California law.' The trial court in-
structed the jury to assess the material in accordance with the contempo-
rary community standards of the state of California. Miller appealed to the
Superior Court of California urging that the use of state rather than na-
tional standards violated the first amendment. The Supreme Court, in
affirming the Superior Court's decision concluded that nothing in the first
amendment compels a jury to consider unascertainable national standards
when attempting to determine whether certain materials are obscene.'
Miller is a landmark decision because it significantly alters two of the
determinants formerly contained in the Court's definition of obscenity.
National standards'" are replaced by local standards as a determinant of
community tastes, and the utterly without redeeming social value test is
altered to the effect that works taken as a whole, which include prurient
and patently offensive depictions of sexual conduct, need only lack a mini-
mum of serious, literary, artistic, political or scientific value to be ob-
scene. 1
(1973) (importation of obscenity for private use prohibited); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton
93 S. Ct. 2628 (1973) (obscene films not constitutionally immune though exhibited to consent-
ing adults only).
7. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2617 (1973). The Court confines the scope of state
legislation to material involving sexual conduct and further stipulates that such conduct must
be specifically defined by statute. Miller also gives two examples of acceptable definitions:
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal
or perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive representation or descriptions of masturbation, excretory func-
tions and lewd exhibition of the genitals. Id. at 2615.
The Court proceeds to pronounce the new guidelines for the jury:
(a) [Wihether "the average person applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest ...
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law, and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value. Id. at 2615.
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2(a) (West 1970).
9. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2619 (1973).
10. The use of national standards meant that the jury was to consider the sensibilities of
the nation as a whole when deciding whether or not certain material was obscene. Jacobellis
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). Comparable to the reasonable man in tort law, national stan-
dards theoretically objectified the test for obscenity. Realistically viewed, however, such
standards have imposed a more liberal test.
11. The utterly without redeeming social value test prohibited a jury from finding certain
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The idea of community standards as a determinant of obscenity was first
advanced by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Kennerley.'2 Judge
Hand's contribution to providing standards for pornography was recog-
nized in Roth v. United States" wherein the Supreme Court incorporated
cominunity standards into an attempted comprehensive definition of ob-
scenity. Roth left many questions unanswered-the most burdensome
being the meaning of "community."'" An attempt to provide the answer
was made in a later Supreme Court case in which it was decided that
community standards would be nationwide;' 5 however, since this ruling
was only supported by a plurality of the Court, the geographical sphere of
community remained uncertain and federal and state authorities remained
without definitive constitutional guidelines."
matter obscene if it contained the least amount of social importance even though all the other
elements of obscenity were present. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966). The
purpose of the test was to safeguard legitimate freedom of expression and, understandably,
the net effect has been to make the prosecution's case harder.
12. 209 F. 119, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). In Judge Hand's opinion, community standards
were meant to represent "the average conscience of the time" which engenders "general
notions about what is decent" but which necessarily has "a varying meaning from time to
time". Id. at 121.
13. 354 U.S. 476 488-89 (1957). Roth was the landmark case on obscenity prior to Miller.
Roth rejected the common law standard set down in Queen v. Hicklin, [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B.
359, which judged material by the effect of an isolated excerpt upon particular susceptible
persons, and replaced it with the test:
[W]hether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest. Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,489 (1957).
Prurient interest was defined as "material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts" Id.
at 487 n.20. See also ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4 (1) Obscene Defined (Official Draft
1962).
14. Virginia's amended obscenity statute exemplifies the divergence in interpretations of
Roth. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-227 (1960). The statute replaces the Roth yardstick of "contem-
porary community standards" with "the degree of public acceptance of the book, or books of
similar character, within the county or city in which the proceeding is brought." Id. § 18.1-
236.3 (8) (b). Apparently, the Assembly thought the use of county, and even city standards
was consistent with Roth. See Price v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 113, 189 S.E.2d 324 (1972).
Contra, Tzx. ANN. PENAL CODE art. 527 § 3 (1963) ". . . the term 'contemporary community
standards' shall in no case involve a territory or geographic area less than the State of Texas".
15. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) did not resolve the ambiguity over "community
standards." There was no Court opinion and only four Justices focused on the question.
Justices Brennan and Goldberg agreed on nationwide standards. Chief Justice Warren, joined
in his dissent by Justice Clark, proposed a local test. The law remained uncertain. See
Seaton, Obscenity: The Search for a Standard, 13 KAN. L. Rv. 117 (1964).
16. Up until Miller, a majority of federal jurisdictions had been using national standards.
See United States v. 35 MM. Motion Picture Films, 432 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1970); United States
v. A Motion Picture Film, 404 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1968); Chemline, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie,
364 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1966); Meyer v. Austin, 319 F.Supp. 457 (M.D. Fla. 1970); United
States v. One Carton Positive Motion Picture Film, 247 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), rev'd,
1974]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Roth also left uncertain the question of whether or not certain matter
had to be found utterly without redeeming social value to be obscene. 7 The
social value of pornography was first considered by the Supreme Court in
1942.11 Later Roth described obscenity as utterly without redeeming social
importance, but did not indicate if it had the intention of including such
a test as a requisite to finding obscenity. 9 Subsequently, the Court noted
that obscene matter was precluded from first amendment protection for
the very reason that it was utterly without redeeming social importance. 2
Finally, a plurality held the social value criterion to be a required element
of the Roth test.2'
The use of national, rather than local, standards and the requirement
that works had to be judged valueless to be obscene, made conviction on
an obscenity charge difficult. This resulted in an increased flow of hard-
core pornography. Miller reacts to this result by discrediting and abandon-
ing these determinants of obscenity.
Miller's argument against the utterly without redeeming social value
test is threefold: first, the test is not and has never been constitutional
367 F.2d 889 (1966). But see United States v. Groner - F.2d - (CA 5 1973); Stein v.
Batchelor, 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex. 1969), vacated for improper jurisdiction, 401 U.S. 200
(1971); United States v. West Coast News Co., 30 F.R.D. 13 (W.D. Mich. 1962). State
jurisdictions had been about evenly divided on the issue. For the exhaustive list of cases and
comment thereon see Barber, The Geography of Obscenity's "Contemporary Community
Standard", 8 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 81, 82 (1971); 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 691, 693 n.14 (1971).
17. Compare Attorney Gen. v. Book Named "Tropic of Cancer", 345 Mass. 11, 184 N.E.2d
328 (1962) with People v. Fritch, 13 N.Y.2d 119, 192 N.E.2d 713, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963).
18. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
19. 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
20. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
21. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
The plurality held:
A book cannot be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly without redeeming social
value. This is so even though the book is found to possess the requisite prurient appeal
and to be patently offensive. Each ... criteria is to be applied independently ....
Id. at 419.
The revised Virginia obscenity statute did not include the social value element of Memoirs.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-227 (1960). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
recognized that Virginia courts were bound by the United States Supreme Court's obscenity
standards, expressly including the utterly without redeeming social value test. House v.
Commonwealth, 210 Va. 121, 169 S.E.2d 572, 575 (1969). Upon review, it was held that the
statute was not unconstitutional because the interpretation of Virginia's highest court was
as definitive as if the statute was amended by legislation. Grove Press, Inc. v. Evans, 306 F.
Supp. 1084 (E.D.Va. 1969). Miller's rejection of this component of Memoirs however, should
have the effect of negativing Grove leaving the constitutionality of the statute once more at
issue. For a survey of proposed changes in Virginia's obscenity law see Comment, Proposed
Changes in Statutory Regulation of Obscenity in Virginia, 57 VA. L. REv. 1636 (1971).
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law;2 second, such a test forces prosecutors to affirmatively prove that
certain matter is totally devoid of value-a near impossible task under
criminal standards of proof;2 third, the phrase utterly without redeeming
social value is meaningless.2 4 The first argument is addressed to the fact
that the social value requirement came from a plurality opinion. By strict
stare decisis, such a ruling would not establish valid precedent, but this
technical procedural point alone does not warrant abandonment of the
test. The second argument is valid to the extent that it is indeed difficult
to prove the negative-that certain material has no social value. But, this
burden is far from impossible.25 The third argument is not without merit.
The phrase utterly without redeeming social value may be nebulous and
decisions based thereon are apt to be arbitrary.26 Nevertheless, Miller ig-
nores the fact that Roth justified precluding obscenity from first amend-
ment protection on the specific ground that obscene materials were utterly
lacking in social importance. 27 Roth's justification for the censorship of
22. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2613 (1973).
23. Id. Dissenting in a companion case, Justice Brennan noted that Miller does not explain
how its new serious, literary, artistic, political or scientific value test will cure the problem
of proving the negative in prosecuting cases. The Justice portended prosecutors will have the
more difficult task of measuring a minimum of serious social value by some undefined stan-
dard and weighing it against the equally vague concepts of patent offensiveness and pru-
riency, the other two elements of the tripartite Miller test. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
93 S. Ct. 2628, 2655 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
24. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2635 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
25. Aware of the problem in 1966, the Court facilitated the prosecutor's case by providing
that evidence of pandering might justify concluding certain material had no social value.
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 467-70 (1966).
26. Id. at 480 (Black, J., dissenting).
27. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). The Court has never adequately
explained the reason for denying obscenity first amendment protection. Chaplinsky first
dealt with the problem by dividing speech into two categories: that which was worthy of
protection and that which was not. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). The types of speech in the unpro-
tected category were "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
'fighting words.'" Id. at 571-72. Obscenity, along with these other types of utterances,
were denied protection on the ground that exposure to obscene materials lead to anti-social
conduct. Id. at 572. Roth cited Chaplinsky as authority that obscenity was not protected
by the first amendment, but disregarded the argument that obscenity caused anti-social
conduct. Roth v. United States supra at 481; see REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PORNO-
GRAPHY AND OBSCENITY 27 (1970) (found no connection between exposure to obscene materi-
als and commission of sex crimes). Since speech could only be proscribed if it fostered such
conduct, Roth's abandonment of this argument necessarily implied that obscenity was some-
thing less than speech. Behind Roth was the idea that speech by definition communicated
information containing social importance, whereas obscenity was a mere utterance which
conveyed no value whatsoever. Thus, the Court came to the conclusion that the censorship
of obscenity was completely justified because it was "utterly without redeeming social im-
portance." Roth V. United States supra at 484. Miller affirmed Roth presumably because
obscenity was worthless and therefore not protected. Defying logic, however, the same Court
1974]
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obscenity is now rejected, on the ground that it has no meaning; however,
the censorship still remains. Compounded by the fact that Miller affirmed
Roth, this anomaly raises serious doubts as to the validity of excluding
obscenity from protected areas of expression. 8
Notwithstanding this criticism, Miller has decided that obscenity is to
remain outside first amendment protection. Hence, the utterly without
redeeming social value test should not be abandoned, for it is at least more
clear than the uncertain test Miller has prescribed in its place. Under the
old test, the jury had to decide that the material in question either did or
did not have social value. 9 Instead, Miller suggests that the jury is compe-
tent enough to decide if a work has sufficient serious value in the fields of
art, literature, politics, or science so as to negate its otherwise offensiveness
and prurient appeal2 The new test is obviously more complex and confus-
ing than the old, and thus leaves more room for arbitrary jury determina-
tions in an area of law which already dangerously borders on infringment
of first amendment rights.
Miller confines the concept of community to the locality rather than the
nation as a whole.2 ' The sine qua non of the Court's reasoning is that
judgment of allegedly obscene material is indeed a question of fact to be
decided by the jury, 3 and, moreover, is a subjective type of factual decision
which is necessarily relative to the individual sensibilities of the juror who
tends to reflect what is tolerable to the average person in the locality from
which he is drawn 23 The Court concedes that first amendment limitations
on the states should not vary from community to community and thus
found that the test for obscenity should not include the utterly without redeeming social value
element because the phrase had no meaning. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2622 (1973).
Instead, the Court ruled that materials lacking some undefined minimum of seriousness may
be banned if a jury found them offensive. Id. at 2615. Thus Miller completely undermined
the key to the conceptual basis of Roth-that obscenity was devoid of value and thus im-
pliedly something less than speech. The new veil of censorship will inevitably cover what Roth
found to be speech expressly protected by the first amendment.
28. See Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2622 (1973). Preoccupation with the question
of providing guidelines for finding obscenity precludes consideration of the more important
question of whether or not obscenity should be denied first amendment protection. Two
Justices of the Supreme Court have consistently held that it should not: Id. at 2624 n. 6
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
29. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
30. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2615 (1973).
31. It appears that the Court has also opted for local standards in trying violations of
federal obscenity statutes. See United States v. 12-200 Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 93 S.
Ct. 2665 (1973). This is certain to have the effect of hampering mail-order purveyors of
pornography as in Miller. See 21 SW. L.J. 285, 290 (1967).
32. 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2618 (1973).
33. See O'Meara & Shaffer, Obscenity in the Supreme Court: A Note on Jacobellis v. Ohio,
40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1 (1964).
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obscenity should be uniformly precluded protection as a matter of consti-
tutional law .3 However, it asserts that the determination of what falls into
this unprotected category of expression is not a question of law, but is
solely a question of fact. 5 Accordingly, Miller reasons that, since deci-
sions on obscenity consist of factual determinations which by nature differ
according to local community tastes, the first amendment would not be
infringed upon by allowing the same material to be banned in one com-
munity while accepted in another. 6
Miller's argument in favor of local standards appears to be creditable. 7
If the meaning of obscenity can change from time to time," then why not
from place to place? Localities do differ in their cultural tastes and local
standards are presumably easier to determine than supposititious national
standards. However, Miller's treatment of obscenity as a question of fact
relative to the parochial tastes of a jury facilitates abusive restriction of
the right to legitimate freedom of expression. 9 For under Miller, state
statutes, in order to be constitutional, need only meet the requisite of
explicitness in describing sexual conduct. Thus, when prosecutions are
brought under such potentially far-reaching laws, the question of guilt may
rest solely on what a jury guesses the average person in its locality would
find to be patently offensive, prurient and lacking serious, literary, artistic,
political or scientific value."0 It appears that one can no longer disseminate
works on a nationwide scale portraying real life as it is lived by real people
with any certainty that he will not be risking a criminal conviction.
The result reached in Miller makes conflict with legitimate freedom of
expression appear inevitable. The underlying reason is that the Court does
not choose to recognize that judging obscenity involves questions of consti-
tutional law as well as questions of fact." It was the Supreme Court that
34. 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2618 (1973).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2616 n. 9. Chief Justice Burger believes that the nation is simply too big and
diverse to require that a single standard be articulated. Id. at 2618.
37. Miller also puts forth a convincing argument in a footnote to the Court opinion. It
suggests that local standards pose no greater threat to legitimate freedom of expression than
national standards and balances the argument that local standards will prevent dissemina-
tion in risky areas by pointing out that national standards will pose the equally grave danger
of banning materials found tolerable in some areas because they fail to pass a nationwide
test. Id. at 2619 n. 13.
There have been a number of well reasoned law review articles in favor of "local standards".
See Barber, supra note 16; O'Meara & Shaffer, supra note 33. But see Seaton, Obscenity:
The Search for a Standard, 13 KAN. L. REv. 117 (1964).
38. United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 121 (S-D.N.Y. 1913).
39. See 16 S.C.L. REv. 639, 642 (1964).
40. To appreciate the indefiniteness of case law definitions of obscenity see Note,
Obscenity-What is the Test? 5 Aiz. L. Rav. 265 (1964).
41. See Justice Brennan's opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1964).
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denied obscenity protection in the first instance," and in so doing, ac-
cepted the serious responsibility of preventing abuse of this critical excep-
tion to first amendment guarantees. The Court is thus obligated to insure
that fundamental freedoms of speech and press are not abused in any case
involving obscenity. This task undoubtedly necessitates dealing with ques-
tions of constitutional law of the most delicate kind.4" Miller abandons this
responsibility by construing the determination of obscenity to be a pure
factual question relative to local community tastes. This circumvention of
judicial duty will have the effect, not only of restricting the lower courts
in deciding such issues," but of eliminating the precaution of ultimate
review by the Supreme Court.4"
The majority of the Court in Miller made its decision in anticipation of
tightening the reins on pornography, providing the proper authorities with
clear guidelines for carrying out this design, and alleviating the Supreme
Court's burden of reviewing a mass of pornography cases. Although it is
too early to judge the success of Miller's intentions, the immediate impact
has been one of mass confusion and vigorous reaction." Legal authorities
on both sides of the issue predict a landslide of litigation due to the uncer-
tainty surrounding the decision.4" Overzealous legislators construe Miller
as a green light to establish tougher obscenity laws.4" Publishers, booksell-
ers and moviemakers vow that they will fight what they see as a broad
assault on first amendment freedoms.49 Some prosecutors predict the per-
centage of successful prosecutions will increase dramatically snowballing
42. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
43. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
44. If obscenity is viewed basically as a question of constitutional law, the trial judge may
dispose of many cases before they get to the jury:
The trial judge must apply the constitutional standards to the specific material, in the
light of any factual findings supported by the evidence, for if in his judgment the
material cannot constitutionally be supressed, then nothing remains for the jury's
consideration. State v. Hudson County News Co., 41 N.J. 247, 252, 196 A.2d 225, 230
(1963).
However, if obscenity is viewed as a pure question of fact, the trial judge will have no choice
but to defer to jury determination.
45. Seaton, supra note 37:
The use of a "local" standard by a judge or jury in Kansas or New York, assuming
one to be ascertainable, would eliminate meaningful review by the Supreme Court.
The Justices in Washington lack the experience of Kansas or New York standards
which local judges and juries would presumably possess. Since experience is such an
important source for a decision on obscenity, the Court would simply have to defer to
local determinations. Id. at 122.
46. N.Y. Times, June 23, 1973 at 1, col. 2.
47. Id. at 14, col. 1.
48. Id. at 1, col. 2.
49. Id. at 1, col. 4.
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into massive law enforcement crackdowns, while others believe, in some
areas, "local standards" will make the defendent's case even easier."0 One
state statute has already been ruled unconstitutional under the new stan-
dards.51' At this point, all that can be safely said is that Miller will have
unpredictable and far-reaching effects. At the risk of speculation, however,
time will tell that Miller has failed to answer the hard questions it had
anticipated and has unfortunately raised some harder ones.
G.J.S.
50. Id. at 1, col. 3.
51. The ruling came from Judge Gellinoff in Redlich v. Capri Cinema published August
25, 1973 under New York County, Special Term Part 1. In this first major holding under
Miller, the judge opined that the state statute was "overbroad in its provisions and therefore
unconstitutional ... " The judge also noted that obscenity was to be determined by "con-
temporary community standards and not national standards". - N.Y.L.J. at 1 col. 4 (Aug.
15, 1973).
